Abstract. This paper investigates the problem of establishing trust in service-oriented environments. We focus on providing an infrastructure for evaluating the credibility of raters in a reputation-based framework that would enable trust-based Web services interactions. The techniques we develop would aid a service consumer in assigning an appropriate weight to the testimonies of different raters regarding a prospective service provider. The experimental analysis show that the proposed techniques successfully dilute the effects of malicious ratings.
Introduction
With the introduction of Web services, the Web has started a steady evolution to become an environment where applications can be automatically invoked by other Web users or applications. A Web service is a set of related functionalities that can be programmatically accessed and manipulated over the Web [5] . More precisely, a Web service is a self-describing software application that can be advertised, located, and used across the Web using a set of standards such as WSDL, UDDI, and SOAP [15] [16] . The service-oriented Web represents an attractive paradigm for tomorrow's interactions spanning a wide range of domains from e-economy to e-science and e-government.
The ultimate goal of Web services is to serve as independent components in an organization of services that is formed as a result of consumer demand and which may dissolve post-demand completion. As services proliferate on the Web, several services may provide similar functionalities. Thus, it will be necessary to select a Web service that provides the "best" service compared to other candidates. However, the selection of the best service is not based only on what (or how) the service offers. Web services may make promises about the provided service and its associated quality but may fail partially or fully to deliver on these promises. Thus, the major challenge lies in providing a trust framework for enabling the selection of Web services based on trust parameters. The fundamental rationale behind the need for trust is the necessity to interact with unknown entities [2] [10]. The lack of a global monitoring system for the service-oriented environment exacerbates the problem of trust.
Research results show that reliable reputation systems increase users' trust in the Web [8] [18] [8] . Many online businesses have recognized the importance of reputation systems in improving customers' trust and consequently stimulating sales [18] . Examples include Ebay and Amazon [1] . In fact, managing reputation has itself become a Web business. Examples of online companies whose prime vocation is reputation collection and dissemination include Bizrate, Epinions, Citysearch [8] . Reputation systems are particularly vital in online marketplaces, also known as C2C e-auctions. Several studies have investigated and generally confirmed that in these types of business environments, reputation systems benefit both sellers and buyers [11] [12] . We anticipate that the deployment of reputation systems on the service Web (where services would interact with each other directly much like P2P systems) [16] , will have a significant impact on the growth of the different emerging applications.
A number of research works have recognized the importance of reputation management in online systems and a number of solutions have been proposed (as [9] [22] have focused on protecting reputation systems from unfair or malicious raters' input (aka. votes or ratings). In this paper, we also focus on the problem of protecting the reputation system from malicious raters. Unlike previous solutions that may require special statistical distributions, may use screening to drop some ratings, or involve extensive probabilistic computations [21] [22], we provide easy-to-use techniques for a service-oriented environment that consider all the submitted ratings, can be implemented in a straight forward manner, and which do not involve extensive statistical computations. The proposed techniques are based on the premise that honest and credible raters' testimonies should be given more weight as compared to unknown or dishonest raters. The experimental evidence suggests that the proposed techniques are fairly successful in diluting the effects of malicious ratings, when various rating feedbacks are aggregated to derive a service provider's reputation. We provide the details of our proposed techniques in the next section. In Section 3, we present an experimental analysis of the proposed work. This is followed by Section 4, which concludes the paper with directions for future work.
Credibility of Raters
We assume a reputation model that is distributed in nature. In contrast to thirdparty-based traditional approaches for reputation management, no single entity is responsible for collecting, updating, and disseminating the reputation of Web services. Each service consumer records its own perceptions of the reputation of only the services it actually invokes. This perception is called personal evaluation. For each service s j that it has invoked, a service consumer t i maintains a p-element vector P erEval ij representing t i 's perception of s j 's behavior. Thus, P erEval ij reflects the performance of the provider in consumer's views. However, other service consumers may differ or concur with t i 's observation of s j . A service consumer that inquires about the reputation of a given service provider from its peers may get various differing personal evaluation "feedbacks." To get a correct assessment of the service provider's behavior, all the personal evaluations for s j need to be aggregated. Formally, the reputation of s j , as viewed by a consumer i is defined as:
where L denotes the set of service consumers which have interacted with s j in the past and are willing to share their personal evaluations of s j , and represents the aggregation function. It can be as simple as representing the union of personal evaluations where the output is a real number, or an elaborate process that considers a number of factors to assess a fairly accurate reputation value. Equation 1 provides a first approximation of how the assessed reputation may be calculated. However, the assessed reputation calculation involves various factors that need to be precisely defined and measured. As mentioned earlier, we focus only on one such factor in this paper, i.e., evaluating the credibility of raters, to assign proper weights to their testimonies for reputation aggregation.
Credibility Evaluation Requirement
A service provider that provides satisfactory service (in accordance with its promised quality agreement [10] ), may get incorrect or false ratings from different evaluators due to several malicious motives. In order to cater for such "badmouthing" or collusion possibilities, a reputation management system should weigh the ratings of highly credible raters more than consumers with low credibilities [9] [6] [17] [23] . Thus, Equation 1 can be re-written as a weighted mean where the rater's credibility defines the weight of its testimony:
where Reputation(s j , i) is the assessed reputation of s j as calculated by the service consumer i and C r (t x , i) is the credibility of the service rater t x as viewed by the service consumer i. The credibility of a service rater lies in the interval [0,1] with 0 identifying a dishonest rater and 1 an honest one.
There are a few existing online systems such as eBay, Amazon, Yahoo! Auctions, Auction Universe, Edeal, etc. that use a centralized reputation system. eBay uses a three point scale with with +1 for a positive rating, 0 for neutral and -1 for a negative rating. A user's reputation is a mere aggregation of all the feedbacks received. Thus, a user with 50 positive feedback ratings will have a reputation value equaling one with 300 positive and 250 negative feedback ratings [14] . This clearly does not provide an ideal solution. Some other online businesses use an average over all ratings to compute the reputation of a user.
For instance, Amazon's auction site uses this method. It allows transaction participants to rate on a scale from 1 to 5. Then an average of all feedback ratings to date is calculated to compute an overall reputation score. Thus, a user with ratings of 1, 1, 9, 1, 1, 1, 9, 9, and 1 would have an overall reputation score of 3.7. Clearly, this score is also not in accordance with the ratings received. Thus, designing a ratings system that is robust enough to detect and mitigate the effects of disparate ratings is a fundamental issue [7] [22].
Evaluating Rater Credibility
To overcome the above mentioned problems, several methods have been proposed in literature that screen the ratings based on their deviations from the majority opinion. Examples include the Beta Deviation Feedback [3] , Beta Filtering Feedback [22] , Likemindedness [20] , and Entropy-Based Screening [21] . We adopt a similar notion to dilute the effects of unfair or inconsistent ratings. We use a majority rating scheme, in which the "uniformity of ratings" indicates their accuracy. The basic idea of the proposed method is that: if the reported rating agrees with the majority opinion, the rater's credibility is increased and decreased otherwise. Unlike previous models, we do not simply disregard/discard the rating if it disagrees with the majority opinion but consider the fact that the rating's inconsistency may be the result of an actual experience. Hence, only the credibility of the rater is changed, but the rating is still considered.
We use a data clustering technique to define the majority opinion by grouping similar feedback ratings together [7] [19] . We use the k-mean clustering algorithm [13] on all current reported ratings to create the clusters. The most densely populated cluster is then labelled as the "majority cluster" and the centroid of the majority cluster is taken as the majority rating (denoted M ):
where k is the total number of clusters, max(x) gives the cluster with the largest membership and centroid(x) gives the centroid of the cluster x.
The Euclidean distance between the majority rating (M ) and the reported rating (V ) is computed to adjust the rater credibility. The change in credibility due to majority rating, denoted by M f is defined as:
where σ is the standard deviation in all the reported ratings. Note that M f does not denote the rater's credibility (or the weight), but only defines the effect on credibility due to agreement/disagreement with the majority rating. How this effect is applied will be discussed shortly. There may be cases in which the majority of raters collude to provide an incorrect rating for the provider Web service. Moreover, the outlier raters (ones not belonging to the majority cluster) may be the ones who are first to experience the deviant behavior of the providers. Thus, a majority rating scheme 'alone' is not sufficient to accurately measure the reputation of a Web service.
We supplement the majority rating scheme by adjusting the credibility of a service rater based on its past behavior as well. The historical information provides an estimate of the trustworthiness of the service raters [22] . The trustworthiness of the service is computed by looking at the 'last assessed reputation value', the present majority rating and that service consumer's provided rating. It is known that precisely defining what constitutes a credible rating is an interesting and hard research problem by itself [23] . However, we have attempted to define the credibility of Web services in a practical manner according to the information available to the service consumer. We define a credible rater as one which has performed consistently, accurately, and has proven to be useful (in terms of ratings provided) over a period of time.
Consistency is the defined behavior of a service that exhibits similar results under standard conditions. We believe that under controlled situations (i.e., other variables being the same), a service consumer's perception of a Web service should not deviate much, but stay consistent over time. We assume the interactions take place at time t and the service consumer already has record of the previously assessed reputations (denoted A), which is defined as:
where Reputation(s j , i) is as defined in Equation 1 for each time instance t, is the aggregation operator and k is the time duration defined by each service consumer. It can vary from one time instance to the complete past reputation record of s j . Note that A is not the "personal evaluation" of either the service rater or the service consumer but is the "assessed reputation" calculated by the service consumer at the previous time instance(s). If the provider behavior does not change much from the previous time instance, then A and the present rating V should be somewhat similar. Thus, the effect on credibility due to agreement/disagreement with the last assessed reputation value (denoted Af ) is defined in a similar manner as Equation 3 (by replacing M k with A k ).
In real-time situations it is difficult to determine the different factors that cause a change in the state of a Web service. A rater may rate the same service differently without any malicious motive, i.e., accurately (but not consistent with the last reporting). Thus, the credibility of a rater may change in a number of ways, depending on the values of V , M f , and Af . The equivalence of the majority rating M f , submitted personal evaluation rating V and the assessed reputation at the previous time instance Af is used in adjusting the service rater's credibility C r . The general formula is:
where ℵ is the credibility adjustment normalizing factor, M f , and Af are as defined above. The signs ± indicate that either + or − can be used, i.e., the increment or decrement in the credibility depends on the situation. These situations are described in detail in the upcoming discussion. Note that Equation 5 is stated such that a service consumer that wishes to omit the Af effect, and only use the majority rating as basis of credibility calculation, can do so with ease (by setting Af = 0). Also, the definition of Af can be extended to interpolated or forecasted reputation values instead of past assessed reputation value. As mentioned earlier, the equivalence or difference of V with M and A directly affects the credibility of a service rater. Similar to previous works [3] 
where α is a natural number with α ≥ 1, and β is a rational number in the range [0, 1]. The exact values of α and β are left at the discretion of the service consumer. However, through experimental evidence we have found that α ≥ max.rep.val., and β < 0.5 (where max.rep.val is the maximum reputation value on the scale: 10 in our case) provide the most accurate results. α and β directly effect the value of ℵ and in turn influence the rater credibility. Note that in Equation 5 , a higher value of α results in low increment of the rater credibility (as ℵ becomes low), a higher value of β results in a larger decrement of the rater credibility (as ℵ becomes large) and vice versa. In essence, α and β only influence the value of ℵ, but the similarity or difference of V , M , and A determines whether rater credibility is incremented or decremented.
Adjusting Rater Credibilities
V , M , and A can be related to each other in one of four ways. In the following, we provide an explanation of each and show how credibilities are updated in our proposed model.
1. The local reported reputation value is similar to both the majority rating and the previously assessed reputation, i.e., (V M A). The equality M A suggests that the majority of raters believe the quality of s j has not changed. The service rater's credibility is updated as:
Equation 7 states that since all factors are equal, the credibility is incremented. 2. The individual reported reputation rating is similar to the majority rating but differs from the previously assessed reputation, i.e., (V M ) and (V = A). In this case, the change in the reputation rating could be due to either of the following. First, the rater may be colluding with other service consumers (raters) to increase/decrease the reputation of s j . Second, the quality of s j may have actually changed since A was last calculated. The service rater's credibility is updated as:
Equation 8 states that since V M , the credibility is incremented, but the factor V = A limits the incremental value to |M f − Af | (not as big as the previous case). 3 . The individual reported reputation value is similar to the previously assessed reputation but differs from the majority rating, i.e., (V = M ) and (V A). The individual reported reputation value may differ due to either of the following. First, V may be providing a rating score that is out-dated. In other words, V may not have the latest score. Second, V may be providing a "false" negative/positive rating for s j . The third possibility is that V has the correct rating, while other consumers contributing to M may be colluding to increase/decrease s j 's reputation. Neither of these three options should be overlooked. Thus, the service rater's credibility is updated as:
Equation 9 states that since V = M , the credibility is decremented. And to cater for the above mentioned possibilities brought in due to the factor V A, the value that is subtracted from the previous credibility is adjusted to |M f − Af |. 4. The individual reported reputation value is not similar to either the majority rating or the calculated reputation, i.e., (V = M ) and (V = A). V may differ from the majority rating and the past calculated reputation due to either of the following. First, V may be the first one to experience s j 's new behavior. Second, V may not know the actual quality values. Third, V may be lying to increase/decrease s j 's reputation. The service rater's credibility is updated as:
Equation 10 states that the inequality of all factors means that rater's credibility is decremented, where the decremented value is the combination of both the effects (M f and Af ).
Even with the above mentioned techniques in place, every ratings submission that a service consumer receives from service raters may not prove useful. In other words, the consumer's own experience (denoted OE) with the provider may differ from the rater's feedback (denoted RF ). We propose that after each interaction, apart from rating the provider s j , the service consumer also evaluate the usefulness of the raters that provided a rating for s j . If the Euclidean distance between OE and RF falls below a predefined threshold, RF is deemed useful, otherwise it is not. We assume that raters and consumers have similar attribute preferences, and thus no philosophical differences exist between them while rating the same provider, i.e., under normal (and non-malicious) cases, both should have similar experiences.
The usefulness of a service is required to calculate a service rater's "propensity to default," i.e., the service rater's tendency to provide false/incorrect ratings. There may also be cases where raters alternate between being useful and not useful, over a period of time. Thus, to get a correct estimate of the rater's propensity to default, we compute the ratio of the total number of times the ratings submission was useful (k) over the total number of submissions (n). The usefulness factor (u f ) is:
where U i is the submission where the rater was termed 'useful' and V x denotes the total number of ratings submissions by that service. The rater's credibility (calculated using either of Equations 7 through 10) is then adjusted as:
We need to make a few observations for the above mentioned techniques. First, the consumer can base his decision only on the information he has (from the past), and the information he gathers (in form of feedback ratings). Second, the credibility of the raters is directly influenced by the number of ratings that are similar to each other, and previously assessed provider reputation. The proposed techniques emphasize the "majority rating" where the agreement with the majority results in a credibility (and hence weight) increment. We believe this is a valid assumption as malicious raters are likely to be scattered, and an attempt to gain a majority (through collusion) would prove too costly [19] . Third, even if the large majority in one round wrongfully alters a provider's reputation (and rater credibilities), the consequent rounds will detect malicious rating anomalies. If a large number of raters continue to act maliciously for extended periods of time, then such anomalies are hard to detect as a service consumer cannot decide on the actual honesty of the majority of raters. This is also in accordance with the real life social networks phenomenon [4] . However, the consumer's own personal experience aids in detecting such malicious raters. We believe that the strength of our proposed techniques lies in the ability of a service consumer to identify malicious raters (either in the present round or in consequent ones), and assess the provider reputation accordingly. This is substantiated through a series of experiments that follow.
Experimental Evaluations
We have conducted preliminary experiments to assess the robustness of the proposed techniques. Here we report on the service environment created with interactions spanning over 1000 time-instances for a set of hundred (100) Web services. The number of services and time iterations are not fixed, and can both be extended to produce similar results. The service providers are divided into five groups of twenty members each. The first group of providers behave consistently with high quality (different attributes are pre-defined). The next group performs with consistently low quality. The third group performs with high values for the first 500 time instances but then suffer a performance degradation. The fourth group acts in an opposite manner to the third group where providers perform with low values in the beginning. After the tenth time instance, they ameliorate their behavior and start performing with high quality. The final group of providers perform in a random manner, switching between high and low values. We have also divided the group of service raters to simulate actual rating behavior. The hundred service consumers have been divided into three groups. Each group represents members with high credibility in terms of rating providers, members with low rating credibility and members with varied (random) rating credibility respectively. In our experiments, service raters with varying credibilities can exist in the environment in one of four ways: honest raters (high credibility) can out number dishonest raters (low credibility), the number of honest and dishonest raters can center around a "mean credibility value," the number of honest and dishonest raters can be equal, or the dishonest raters can out number honest raters. We acknowledge the fact that rater credibilities can change over a period. Due to space restrictions, we show results from the worst case, i.e., where low credibility raters out number their honest peers. Figure 1 shows the reputation assessment procedure in the situation where consumer credibilities are low. Though comparable to the actual provider behavior, these ratings show slight variation. This is due to the loaded reporting of non-credible raters. Since consumer reporting is not uniform and is dishonest, the assessed reputations show variance from the actual provider performance values. The majority ratings calculated in any instance are used directly to compute rater credibilities and provider reputations. In the following, we list the results of reputation evaluation using different β (for punishment) values (with only a constant α/reward value due to space restrictions) to compute rater credibility and consequently provider reputations.
Reputation Evaluation with Low β Values: The reputations calculated using low β values in Equation 6 are compared with the original provider performance and the results are shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 -A shows the results for a "high performing" provider, i.e., the provider performs consistently with high quality values. The assessed reputations are shown for two main scenarios. In the first scenario, the majority of raters have high credibility. In the second scenario, malicious raters out-number honest raters. Since low β values are chosen, rater credibility suffers low decrement in case of a dishonest rating report. The first scenario results in the calculated reputations being very close to the original provider performance (shown by a dashed line) since dishonesty is minimal. However, in the second scenario, the large number of malicious raters directly affects the majority rating and hence the final assessed reputation. Therefore, the assessed reputation (shown by a dotted line) is not close to the original performance. Similarly graphs in Figure 2 -B through E show the comparison for other service provider groups. 
Fig. 2. Original Performance and Assessed Reputation Comparison Using Low β Value
Reputation Evaluation with High β Values: The comparison between original provider performance and assessed reputation using high β values in Equation 6 is shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 -C shows the results for a provider that performs with high quality values in the beginning and then its performance drops. Similar to the the previous case, the assessed reputations are shown for two main scenarios. In the first scenario, the majority of raters have high credibility. In the second scenario, malicious raters out-number honest raters. In our proposed model, any deviation from either M or A negatively effects the rater's credibility. The results in the first scenario are not much different from the previous case and assessed reputations are very close to the original provider performance (shown by a dashed line). This is due to the manner in which credibilities are evaluated. However, the results in the second scenario using a high β value differs from the previous case, and the assessed reputations are relatively closer to the original provider performance. This is due to the 'punishing' behavior when rater's evaluation differs from the majority rating and the previous assessed reputation (Equation 7 through Equation 10). Although the assessed reputation (shown by a dotted line) is not so close to the original performance. But the calculated values mostly lie within an acceptable two-threshold. Similarly graphs in Figure 3 -A through E show the comparison for other service provider groups. 
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a framework to evaluate the credibility of service raters for feedback based service-oriented reputation systems. However, the proposed approach could easily be extended to any kind of P2P interactions involving unknown peers. We conducted some experiments to verify the presented framework and some of the results are included in this paper. In the future, we aim to incorporate techniques to address bootstrapping issues and provide methods for automatic rating of services. Another important research direction that we intend to undertake is to define a reputation model for composed Web services. We anticipate that solving trust related issues this will provide arguments to introduce fundamental changes in today's approaches for Web services selection and composition.
